Determinants of Bank Risk-Taking: The Role of Regulation, Competition, and Financial Disclosure
This study aimed to examine the determinants of risk-taking behavior among Iraqi commercial banks by assessing the effects of regulation, competition, financial disclosure, bank-specific characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and institutional quality. This study employed a quantitative causal-explanatory design using a dynamic panel-data framework. The study population included licensed Iraqi commercial banks operating between the first quarter of 2010 and the fourth quarter of 2024. After data screening, the final unbalanced panel included 38 commercial banks and 2,036 bank-quarter observations. Bank-level data were extracted from audited quarterly financial statements, while regulatory and sector-level indicators were obtained from Central Bank of Iraq reports. Macroeconomic variables, including real GDP growth, inflation, exchange-rate volatility, and oil-price volatility, were collected from international databases. Institutional quality indicators were also incorporated. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, static panel regressions, and dynamic System-Generalized Method of Moments estimation. Semi-structured expert interviews were used only to contextualize the quantitative findings. The inferential results showed that regulatory intensity had a significant negative effect on bank risk-taking in both static and dynamic models. Financial disclosure quality, capital adequacy, liquidity, profitability, and institutional quality also significantly reduced risk-taking. In contrast, banking competition pressure, bank size, inflation, exchange-rate volatility, and oil-price volatility significantly increased risk exposure. The dynamic System-GMM results confirmed strong persistence in bank risk-taking over time. Institutional quality significantly strengthened the risk-reducing effect of regulation, while financial disclosure significantly weakened the risk-enhancing effect of competition. Ownership-based robustness analysis indicated that privately owned banks were more sensitive to competition-driven risk, whereas foreign-affiliated banks benefited more strongly from disclosure discipline. The study concludes that bank risk-taking in Iraq is shaped by the interaction of regulatory enforcement, competitive pressure, disclosure transparency, internal financial resilience, institutional quality, and macroeconomic instability. Strengthening prudential regulation alone is insufficient unless accompanied by improved disclosure standards, stronger governance mechanisms, and more credible institutional enforcement.